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HIGH DRAMA ON THE HIGH COURT:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE 1996 TERM
Marjorie Heins'
"High drama" is perhaps an exaggeration, but the Supreme
Court's First Amendment decisions in the 1996 term did provide
some extraordinary moments. Foremost in the drama department
was undoubtedly Reno v. ACLU,2 the Court's unanimous
rejection of a sweeping Internet anti-" indecency" law, a decision
that just may spell the beginning of the end for the indecency
standard long favored by Congress in legislation restricting sexual
speech. In other speech cases, Turner Broadcasting System v.
FCC,3 known in the trade as Turner II, represented a surprising
turnabout from Turner 1 4 in terms of the deference that at least
five justices seem willing to pay Congress when they deem a law
to b e a content-neutral economic regulation of speech. Gliclman
v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.5 was even more surprising: a
commercial "forced speech" case in which a different majority of
five managed to find that no First Amendment issue was involved
at all. In addition, there were two religion cases: Agostini v.
Felton6 made unprecedented use of a procedural device to
overrule an Establishment Clause decision 12 years before in the
same case; while Boerne v. P.F. Flores sternly slapped
Congress' hands for having tried the same trick, only through
legislation-that is, for having, through the 1993 Religious
I Founding Director, American Civil Liberties Union Arts Censorship
Project; J.D., Harvard Law School; Author, Sex, Sin and Blasphenq: A Guide
to America's Censorship Wars (1993). The author was co-counsel for the
plaintiffs in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, one of the cases discussed
in the text.
2 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
3 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
4 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
- 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
6 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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Freedom Restoration Act [hereinafter "RFRA"],8 attempted to
overrule a Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause precedent set
seven years before.9
Meanwhile, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,'O
confirmed six members of the Court's relative lack of sympathy
for the burdens imposed on independent third parties trying to
break into the entrenched two-party electoral system. And
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York," the
Court's latest encounter with the free speech claims of abortion
clinic protesters, saw yet another split on more or less ideological
lines over what precisely constitutes an unacceptable burden on
political speech.
Indeed, the speech decisions can all be seen as variations on
this one theme: when and how severely does a law or other
government action burden speech, and consequently, what level
of judicial scrutiny applies? Deciding whether a challenged
action is content-based or content-neutral, for example, usually
determines a case's outcome, but the distinction is often far from
self-evident, as the justices' disputes over the question in Turner,
Schenck, and Glickman illustrated.
Despite the Court's rejection of clearly content-based
censorship in Reno, the government actually won more speech
cases than it lost in the 1996 term: four (or at least 3 2/3) out of
five. In Schenck, Turner, and Timmons, the majority deferred to
regulatory judgments made by a court, Congress, and a state
legislature respectively, despite these judgments' impact on free
speech rights. In the religion cases, the Court again deferred to
the power of government to strike balances: Agostini 2 deferred to
Congress' and New York State's judgments about the best way to
provide educational aid to disadvantaged students at parochial
schools; and Boerne v. Flores," though in one sense an activist
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000-bb et seq. (1993).
9 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990).
'o 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
"1 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
12 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
"3 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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decision striking down a federal law, was also an act of deference
to the 50 states' legislative and police powers, which the Boerne
majority viewed as dangerously threatened by RFRA's
requirement that burdens on free exercise of religion must be
justified by a compelling state interest.
RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
To begin with Reno v. ACL U:14 as every computer hacker
knows, this landmark decision struck down the 1996
Communications Decency Act,'5 or, more precisely, three
sections of it. The first section made it a crime to use a
"telecommunications device" to "knowingly" transmit any
communication "which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age." Only
the "indecency" portion of this ban was challenged, and
"indecency" was not defined. Of the other two sections, one
criminalized the use of "an interactive computer service to send
to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age" any
communication that, "in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs .. "' The
third, and by far broadest of the three provisions, criminalized
the same "patently offensive" speech if "display[ed]" online "in
a manner available to a person under 18 years of age." '8
That mouthful of words-"patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards" -derived from the Federal
Communications Commission's original definition of
"indecency," as approved by the Court almost 20 years ago in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,9 which upheld the FCC's
censorship of the famous George Carlin "seven dirty words"
14 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
15 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § V, 47 U.S.C. § 223 et seq. (1996).
16 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
17 47 U.S.C. § 223 (d)(1)(A).
18 47 U.S.C. § 223 (d)(1)(B).
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comic monologue.' The standard tracks one prong of the
Supreme Court's Miller v. Califoia2 test for distinguishing
proscribable "obscenity" from other, constitutionally protected
speech about sex, but unlike the obscenity test, indecency does
not require that the speech appeal predominantly to the "prurient
interest," or that it lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."2 Congress had used the indecency standard
several times since Pacifica, in legislation restricting minors'
access to sexual speech through telephone services and cable TV,
and even though these laws were in large part struck down, the
Supreme Court had not previously questioned either the propriety
or lack of precision in a speech restriction turning on such
subjective concepts as "patent offensiveness" and "contemporary
community standards. "3 For purposes of Reno, both the three-
judge court that first heard the case, and the Supreme Court,
treated "indecent" and "patently offensive" according to
"contemporary community standards" as synonymous terms.24
The plaintiffs in Reno included both for-profit and nonprofit
Internet speakers, many of which maintained World Wide Web
sites on such subjects as safer sex, gay and lesbian issues, human
rights abuses, feminism, censorship, prison rape, and
20 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
21 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The three-prong Miller test is
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
2Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758.
See Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S.
115 (1989); Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). Four justices said
as recently as June 1996 in the Denver Area case that government does have a
compelling need to "protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-
related material." Id. at 2386.
24 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345; American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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reproductive rights?2 Conspicuously absent were
cyberpornographers, 26 and although the government throughout
the litigation emphasized that the CDA's purpose was to protect
children from online smut (of which it inserted a great quantity
into the record), the ACLU's approach was to stress the
subjectivity and indeterminacy of such terms as "patently
offensive" and "contemporary community standards" and the
fact that this indecency definition, by omitting the "prurient
interest" and "lack of serious value" prongs of the Miller
obscenity test, included speech that had serious literary,
educational, or other value for minors as well as adults.2 The
tree-judge district court held all three provisions of CDA facially
overbroad; two of the three judges also found the indecency
standard unconstitutionally vague.
Reno v. ACLU was widely viewed as a case primarily about
cyberspace - what standard of First Amendment scrutiny would
apply to restrictions on speech in this new and complex
medium?' The deeply flawed CDA was Congress' reaction to a
rapidly expanding medium where speech that could reach millions
instantly was relatively cheap and very uncensored.29  The
government argued that cyberspace was as intrusive as
broadcasting:3" offensive speech could invade the home without
warning; and therefore the same deferential standard of First
Amendment scrutiny that the Court had used in Pacifica ought to
apply.31 Justice Stevens' opinion for seven members of the Court
definitively rejected this argument: the Internet, he said, includes
audio, video, text, and pictures; it enables "any person with a
phone line" to "become a town crier with a voice that resonates
farther than it could from any soapbox"; and "[t]hrough the use
of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups," allows "the
25Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334-41.
2Id.
27Id. at 2349-51.
28 Id. at 2334-35.
291d. at 2334-36.
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same individual" to become a pamphleteer." 32  Because "the
content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought," there was
"no basis for qualifying the level of' strict First Amendment
scrutiny.
33
Strict scrutiny of course doomed the CDA. For the facts in the
record established that there was no way for the great majority of
Internet speakers to identify or screen out minors from their Web
sites, newsgroups, mail exploders, or chat rooms .3' The
provision banning "display" of indecency "in a manner
available" to minors therefore criminalized almost any
"indecent" speech online. 31 Thus, even assuming that Congress
could ban indecent speech to minors, the display provision was
unconstitutionally overbroad under a line of cases starting with
Butler v. Michigan36 in 1957, which had established that
government cannot under the First Amendment "reduce the adult
population ... to reading only what is fit for children." 3
The two narrower, "knowing transmission" sections of the
CDA posed tougher questions for the Court. Here, the extensive
evidence that sexually explicit speech can have serious value for
minors was critical, for Justice Stevens noted that "[t]he general,
undefined terms 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' cover large
amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or
32 Id. at 2344.
33 Id.
' The Justice Department had argued that affirmative defenses in the CDA-
such as using credit card or adult ID systems- saved the law because
"indecent" speakers could thereby screen out minors and speak only to adults.
See 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5). The Court disagreed because the facts showed that
such methods were not technically or economically viable for the great
majority of online speakers. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349. Likewise, the
government's proposal for "tagging"or self-labeling potentially offensive Web
sites -- perhaps a precursor of things to come in this fast-evolving field -- was
rejected because there was no uniform system of tagging in place or
technology yet developed to read tags and effectively bar minors from labeled
sites. Id.
35 Id. at 2349.
36 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (holding a prohibition on sale to adults of books
deemed harmful to children unconstitutional).
3 Id. at 382-83; see also Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2346; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
378 [Vol 14
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other value," including "discussions about prison rape or safe sex
practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably
the card catalogue of the Carnegie Library." 38
Here, Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist parted company with
the majority. O'Connor's partial dissent viewed the CDA as a
commendable, albeit flawed, attempt to create "adult zones" on
the Internet." She argued that the "specific transmission"
provisions were "not unconstitutional in all of their applications,"
because little "patently offensive" sexual speech is likely to have
redeeming value for minors. Thinking perhaps of seven year-
olds and not 17 year-olds, Justice O'Connor opined that "while
discussions about prison rape or nude art . . . may have some
redeeming educational value for adults, they do not necessarily
have such value for minors."40
Justice O'Connor's dispute with the majority on this point
reflects a deeper conflict over the value of speech about sex to
minors of any age; and this conflict increasingly drives laws
restricting sexual speech. A major problem with all such
legislation, however, is the inevitable vagueness and subjectivity
of its definitional terms. For this reason, the Reno majority's
lengthy discussion of vagueness is highly significant.
"Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the
Fifth Amendment," Justice Stevens wrote:
the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render
it problematic for purposes of the First Amendment.... Could a
speaker confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth
control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues
raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica decision, or the
consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDAVI
38 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347-48.
11 Id. at 2351-53 (O'Connor and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part).
I Id. at 2356 (O'Connor and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 2344. The Pacifica Appendix contains the complete text of
comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue, which the FCC and the
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This language was remarkable coming just a year after Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,42 the
cable indecency case, in which a plurality had without much
analysis rejected a vagueness challenge to an almost identical
indecency standard. What the judicial future holds for the
indecency test remains to be seen, but Justice Stevens' strong
language in Reno at least provides encouragement for those who
have long insisted that the standard is hopelessly vague.
SCHENCK V. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN
NEW YORK
The Court's second major speech case, Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network,43 like Reno involved a hot political conflict: the First
Amendment rights of abortion clinic protesters versus the
governmental interests in public safety and access to reproductive
health care. The injunction challenged in Schenck was issued
after a lengthy history of disruption and physical interference
with access to clinics in upstate New York."4 All of this was
carefully detailed in Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the five-
justice majority affirming two but striking down one aspect of the
injunction.45
The majority upheld a mandatory 15-foot "buffer zone"
protecting the clinic doorways, parking lots, and driveways from
obstruction.46 It also approved a "cease and desist" provision
requiring those demonstrators acting as "sidewalk counselors" to
leave clients entering or leaving the clinics alone after the clients
had asked them to do so; the Court found this provision content-
neutral even though it was triggered by a client's desire not to
hear any more of a "counselor's" message.47 But the Court
airwaves during hours when children were likely to be listening. Justice
Stevens was the author of Pacifica.
41 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
41 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
4Id. at 859-61.
45 Id. at 859-61, 868.
461d. at 868-69.
47 Id. at 870.
380 [Vol 14
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invalidated a mandatory 15-foot "floating bubble" that followed
patients and clinic escorts wherever they went: this was held to be
unworkable and not necessary to serve the relevant government
interests ."8
Some observers were puzzled why the Court had chosen to
immerse itself in the technical details of abortion clinic buffer
zones and bubbles just two years after it had established the
constitutional ground rules in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center.49 Madsen had held, over the dissent of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, that an injunction directed against
abortion protesters was content-neutral even though it did not
address the activities of pro-choice demonstrators." The content-
neutrality of the order meant that the strict scrutiny reserved for
content-based restrictions on speech would not apply;
nevertheless, because injunctions carry particular risks "of
censorship and discriminatory application," the Court in Madsen
held that a "more rigorous" standard of review than the
intermediate scrutiny usually reserved for content-neutral
regulations was needed. 51  "We must ask instead whether the
challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest."52
Justice Scalia, not one to miss an opportunity for a good one-
liner, mocked this new standard by quipping that perhaps "we
could call it intermediate-intermediate scrutiny."'
Schenck followed the analysis prescribed in Madsen, with
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas again partially dissenting.' Justice
41 Id. at 866-69.
49512 U.S. 753 (1994).
501d. at 762-64.
51 Id. at 764-68.
52d. at 765.
5 Id. at 791 (Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
5 Schenk, 117 S. Ct. at 865-71 (majority opinion); Id. at 871 (Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Breyer also dissented in part, believing that all of the injunction should be
upheld because it could be read as not mandating a "floating bubble" at all, or
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Scalia's dissent zeroed in on the majority's approval of the cease
and desist provision, which all agreed had been originally based
on the district court's incorrect view that people "approaching
and entering the facilities [have a right] to be left alone" and
shielded from unwanted messages.55 Justice Scalia accused the
majority of trying to bury this unacceptable justification and
replace it with a public safety and clinic access rationale that in
fact had not been considered by the district court.56 He also
argued that the state trespass law on which the injunction must be
based did not justify equitable relief,3 7 the clinics' constitutional
claim having been eliminated by a 1993 Supreme Court holding
that interference with reproductive health did not constitute sex
discrimination in violation of federal civil rights law. 8 Justice
Scalia was strangely silent about the violence and obstruction that
had necessitated the injunction in the first place.
TURNER V. FCC
If the next major free speech case was less heated politically, it
had big stakes economically, and once again, the issue of what
constitutes content discrimination divided the Court.59 Turner v.
FCC upheld the so-called "must carry" provisions of the 1992
Cable Television Act,' ° which required that cable operators
reserve a certain percentage of their channel capacity for local
broadcast stations that they would not otherwise choose to carry
on their cable systems. 61  Turner I 62 three years earlier had
Id. at 871-74 (Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
51 Id. at 873 (Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 873-75 (Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
58 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
5 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
60 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47
U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (1992).
61 id.
62 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
382 [Vol 14
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vacated and remanded a lower court decision rejecting a First
Amendment "forced speech" attack on "must carry;"63 the
majority there determined that even though forcing cable systems
to turn over significant channel capacity to broadcast stations was
a content-neutral economic regulation intended to help preserve
broadcasting and curb the monopolistic tendencies of cable
companies, further fact development was needed on whether the
law satisfied the intermediate First Amendment scrutiny
applicable to content-neutral regulations of speech.6 That is,
were the restrictions "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance" of an important governmental interest?" Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas had dissented in Turner
1, arguing that must carry was content-based because it reflected
Congress' expressed desire to foster "a diversity of views" in
television programming, including the local public affairs and
educational programming that local broadcast stations supplied.'
On remand from Turner I, a three-judge court had duly
followed the Supreme Court's command to compile a factual
record on the actual peril that local broadcasting faced as a result
of the rising hegemony of cable; and on the possible alternatives
to must carry. On the question of actual peril, it was notable that
cable companies generally wanted to carry major network
broadcast stations, so that only marginal local broadcasters really
needed the protection of the law. On the question of alternatives
to must carry, so-called "leased access" space was available on
most cable systems, and consumers could use A/B switches to
receive both antenna-based broadcast signals and cable feeds,
thereby eliminating the need for mandatory cable transmission of
63 Id.
MId. at 649.
1 Id. at 662. The intermediate scrutiny standard, derived from United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), asks whether the regulation "furthers
an important governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest." Id. (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
6 512 U.S. at 675-80 (O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas, JJ..
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broadcast channels.67 On this latter point, both the district court
and the Turner II majority accepted what I call the couch potato
theory of the First Amendment: that is, because TV viewers are
simply too lazy to use A/B switches, such devices are not an
adequate alternative means of assuring the survival of local
broadcasting.
What was remarkable about Turner II was not so much the
result as the tone. As in Turner I, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority of five. But Turner I had emphasized that when
Congress regulates in the area of speech, its predictive judgments
are not "insulated from meaningful judicial review." 68 On the
contrary, in First Amendment cases, deference to legislative
findings cannot "foreclose our independent judgment on the facts
bearing on an issue of constitutional law." '69 In Turner II, this
limit on congressional power seemed nearly forgotten. The
question, said the majority, is not whether Congress "was correct
to determine must-carry is necessary," but whether "the
legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record before Congress." 70  Courts "are not to
'reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress' factual
predictions with our own.'"
71
The same four dissenters as in Turner I could be forgiven for
expressing some confusion here.72  As Justice O'Connor
protested:
Although we owe deference to Congress' predictive judgments
and its evaluation of complex economic questions, we have an
independent duty to identify with care the Government interests
supporting the scheme, to inquire into the reasonableness of
67 See Turner II, 117 S.Ct. at 1186-89 (Congress' reasonable fear of risk to
broadcasting); id. at 1200-02 (alternatives to must carry).
' Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666 (citing Sable Communications v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)).
69 Id.
70 Turner I, 117 S. Ct. at 1196.
71 Id. at 1201 (quoting Turner L 512 U.S. at 666).
1 Id. at 1205 (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
384 [Vol 14
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congressional findings regarding its necessity, and to examine the
fit between its goals and its consequences.
73
The dissenters also reiterated their view that must carry, premised
as it was on congressional concerns about diversity, quality, and
preservation of local programming, was fundamentally content-
based.74
In a sense, the Court in Turner was stuck in the rigidity of its
own content-based/content-neutral dichotomy. As in the abortion
clinic cases, so in Turner, the majority's insistence that the must
carry legislation was content-neutral seemed primarily driven by
its desire to uphold what it viewed as practical, not ideological,
regulation. The dissenters were surely right that seeking to foster
local programming and a diversity of views is content-based, but
as a practical matter such a legislative goal is not ideologically
repressive; it merely seeks to enhance diverse voices that may
otherwise be frozen out of the marketplace.
What was conspicuously absent from either the majority
opinion or the dissent in Turner II was any acknowledgment that
cable operators, although they are providers of editorial content,
may also be viewed as conduits for the speech of others. There is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits government, when
franchising what amounts to monopoly control over a vital
medium of communication, from reserving some portion of the
cable system for speech not chosen by the monopolist. The
separate concurrences of Justices Stevens and Breyer came closest
to this perception by emphasizing the importance of congressional
action "intended to forestall the abuse of monopoly power,"75 and
untangle the "bottleneck that controls the range of viewer
choice" 76 on cable systems.
7 Id. (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
74Id. at 1205-06 (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, MJ, dissenting).
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GLICKMAN V. WILEMAN BROTHERS & ELLIOTT, INC.
The Court's deference to what it perceives as economic
regulation also drove the result in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers
& Elliott, Inc. ,7 which rejected a First Amendment challenge by
California growers and processors of nectarines, peaches, and
plums to Agriculture Department marketing orders that forced
them to pay for generic advertising." What was surprising in
Glickman was the analysis, which defined the First Amendment
issue out of existence despite the plaintiffs' claimed disagreement
with the content of the generic advertising, and their expressed
desire to spend their funds on advertising of their own.79
Justice Stevens, for a majority of five, described the advertising
assessments as simply part of a larger scheme of economic
regulation that, in exchange for exemption from antitrust laws,
"displaced competition in a number of discrete [agricultural]
markets" with collective research, development, inspection,
packaging, and marketing.80 Moreover, the marketing orders did
not compel anybody to "engage in any actual or symbolic
speech." 81  He distinguished away the Court's line of cases
invalidating "forced speech," from flag salutes in public schools
to compelled contributions to labor union activities, and
concluded that the assessments in the present case are simply not
"comparable to [cases] in which an objection rested on political
or ideological disagreement with the content of the message."
82
The Court found even the intermediate scrutiny balancing test it
had set forth in 1980 in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v.
77 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
78 Id. at 2134.
" Id at 2137.
0 Id at 2134, 2138.
81 Id. at 2138. In fact, said Justice Stevens, "it is fair to presume that [the
plaintiffs] agree with the central message of the speech that is generated by the
generic program." Id.
' Id. at 2140. See West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
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Public Service Comnmission,a  to review restrictions on
commercial speech, too rigorous for the agricultural marketing
program, which was merely "a species of economic regulation
that should enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that we
accord to other policy judgments made by Congress."'
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Rehnquist and Scalia and in
part by Thomas, took sharp issue with the majority's avoidance
of First Amendment scrutiny:" the legitimacy of economic
regulation, Souter said, "does not validate coerced subsidies for
speech that the government cannot show to be reasonably
necessary to implement the regulation."1 6  First Amendment
protection is not limited to political speech, and there is no reason
why the forced speech doctrine should be so limited either?
Applying the Central Hudson test, Justice Souter found the
Agriculture Department's compelled advertising program "so
random and so randomly implemented... as to unsettle any
inference that the Government's asserted interest is either
substantial or even real."1 8 Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent,
reiterated his view that the Central Hudson balancing test does
not sufficiently protect commercial speech rights.89
What was going on here? In light of decisions highly protective
of commercial speech in the Court's preceding two terms,90 why
did five justices refuse to find not only content-based
discrimination in the forced advertising program, but any speech
interest at all? Reno v. ACLU shows that the justices are certainly
ready to strike down content-based censorship legislation when it
comes along; but, as in Turner II, they may be getting impatient
83 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a regulation that completely
banned an electric utility from any advertising that promotes the use of
electricity).
8 Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2142.
1 Id. at 2142 (Souter, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).861Id. (Souter, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 2147 (Souter, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
88 Id. at 2150 (Souter, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
I Id. at 2155 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
9°44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996); Rubin v.
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with challenges to what they view as fundamentally economic
regulation, gussied up in free speech garb.
TIMMONS V. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY
The last speech decision of the term, Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Pary,91 again turned on perceptions of how seriously a
burden imposed by government infringed on First Amendment
rights, and accordingly, what degree of scrutiny should apply.
Minnesota, like most states, bans so-called fusion tickets in which
an individual can be listed as the candidate for office of more than
one party. 92 The New Party challenged the restriction on the
ground that it undermined the party's ability to build a power
base in the face of the formidably entrenched major parties;' if
people can endorse the platform of an independent party while
still casting a vote for a candidate who actually might win, the
independent party will have a far better chance of building
support.'
Five justices, however, thought the rule against fusion too
insignificant a burden on the minor party's First Amendment
associational rights to trigger strict scrutiny.' The majority
opinion by Justice Rehnquist dismissed the court of appeals'
conclusion that "without fusion-based alliances, minor parties
cannot thrive" as a "predictive judgment which is by no means
self-evident. " 96 More important, said Rehnquist, "the supposed
benefits of fusion to minor parties does not require that
Minnesota permit it."" The New Party's desire to use the ballot
to communicate that it supports a particular candidate was
irrelevant because "l[b]allots serve primarily to elect candidates,
not as fora for political expression."98 Because the associational
91 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
92 Id. at 1367.
93 Id. at 1368-69.
94 Id.
9
' Id. at 1370.
96Id. at 1371.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1372.
[Vol 14388
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/8
FIRST AMENDMENT
burdens were not severe, said Rehnquist, the court below had
been wrong to apply strict scrutiny; "the State's asserted
regulatory interests need only be 'sufficiently weighty to justify
the limitation.'"9 Those regulatory interests included "avoiding
voter confusion and overcrowded ballots, [and] preventing party-
splintering and disruptions of the two-party system."'0 Although
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the latter interest does not
permit states to squelch minor parties completely, it does, he
maintained, allow them "to enact reasonable election regulations"
that in practice "favor the traditional two-party system." "'
Because, as the majority conceded, the judgment about undue
burden is malleable, it was not surprising that three justices,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, disagreed with the majority's
assessment." Stevens argued that the burden of the anti-fusion
rule was obviously severe - the "political reality" is "that the
dominance of the major parties frequently makes a vote for a
minor party or independent candidate a 'wasted' vote" 0 - and
that the only state interest directly served by the anti-fusion rule
was protection of the two-party system, which he identified as
"the true basis for the Court's holding. " " This interest was
dubious at best, illegitimate at worst, since it was evident that
legislatures dominated by the major parties passed anti-fusion
laws in order to solidify their own power."
Let me turn now to the religion cases. Only one, Agostini v.
Felton actually turned on either of the First Amendment's religion
clauses, but the other, Boerne v. Flores, in striking down RFRA,
obviously had large consequences for free exercise.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1372.
101 Id. at 1374.
102 Id. at 1375 (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, JJ., dissenting).
1o3 Id. at 1376 n. 1 (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, JJ., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1379 (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, JJ., dissenting).
1 5 Id. (Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Stevens noted that "[t]he
fact that the law was both intended to disadvantage minor parties and has had
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AGOSTINI V. FELTON
Agostini v. Felton'06 involved one easy and one hard question.
The easy one was whether caselaw subsequent to the Court's
1985 decision in Aguilar v. Felton"° had undermined Aguilar's
holding that the Establishment Clause prohibited the expenditure
of government funds to send public school teachers into parochial
schools to provide educational enrichment under Title I of the
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act.'0 8 Given changes
in Court personnel, holdings subsequent to Aguilar allowing
government money to assist in the process of religious education,
and the statement of five justices in the 1994 Kiryas Joel case0 9
that Aguilar should be overruled, the answer was a pretty clear
yes. ' The harder question was whether Agostini was a
procedurally proper vehicle for overruling Aguilar."'
The petitioners in Agostini were still bound, 12 years later, by
the Aguilar injunction requiring them, at significant cost, to
provide services off the premises of parochial schools, either by
transporting the students to public schools or by using leased sites
or mobile vans converted into classrooms.' Having read Kiryas
Joel and having attorneys who obviously could count to five, they
devised the ingenious strategy of moving under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) I 3 for relief from the Aguilar judgment
106 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
107473 U.S. 402 (1985).
108 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et. seq. (1965).
" Bd. of Ed. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (finding a violation of the
Establishment Clause when a separate school district was carved out of an
existing district to service a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim).
10 Id. at 718 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 731 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 750
(Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
' Also at risk was the companion case to Aguilar, Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding unconstitutional two programs in
which public school teachers provided curricular instruction at pervasively
sectarian schools).
112 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005.
113 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) provides in pertinent part:
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on the ground that, in the words of the rule, the judgment " is no
longer equitable."n"4 The district court denied the motion, as
Aguilar was still the law - certainly the law of this particular
case.
The Supreme Court's opinion by Justice O'Connor for a
majority of five focused on two recent decisions from which she
concluded that Aguilar was no longer good law. These were
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,"5 which rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to the provision of a government-
paid translator for a hearing-impaired student at a religious
school; and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,116 similarly rejecting a challenge to a state tuition-
assistance program that a student chose to use for religious
training. Since Zobrest and Witters dispensed with the Court's
earlier bright-line rule that government-funded instruction could
not take place on parochial school premises, it followed that the
Title I program in Agostini was permissible. 
7
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons... the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.
Id.
"4 Id.; see Agostini, 117 S. Ct at 2006.
115 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
116 474 U.S. 48 (1986).
117 Justice O'Connor evaluated the Title I program under the familiar Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), three-part Establishment Clause
test: that is, whether it involved "a secular legislative purpose;" a "principal
or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and no
excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. The result was at this
point a foregone conclusion: she found the program plainly had a secular
purpose and contained sufficient safeguards against religious indoctrination by
the public school teachers. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2008-14. The majority
gave no independent weight to the third, "excessive entanglement" criterion,
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Justice O'Connor then reasoned, in circular fashion, that Rule
60(b)(5) was an appropriate vehicle for formally overruling
Aguilar because "[o]ur general practice is to apply the rule of law
we announce in a case to the parties before us.""1 8 But she also
made an impassioned practical argument that "[i]t would be
particularly inequitable for us to bide our time waiting for another
case to arise while the City of New York labors under a
continuing injunction forcing it to spend millions of dollars on
mobile instructional units and leased sites when it could instead
be spending that money to give economically disadvantaged
children a better chance of success in life by means of a program
that is perfectly consistent with the Establishment Clause." " 9
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and, in part, Breyer
dissented, maintaining that the program struck down in Aguilar
had impermissibly promoted religion, first, because state-paid
teachers might express sympathy for the school's religious aims;
second, because government aid "produced a symbolic union of
church and state"; and third, because the subsidies relieved the
sectarian schools of educational costs they would otherwise have
to bear."0 Nothing in Zobrest or Witters, which involved much
more limited types of aid, undermined a decision striking down a
broad curriculum program that spent tax money to serve about
22,000 students on parochial school premises.'
Justice Ginsburg, in a separate dissent, protested the majority's
unprecedentedly activist use of Rule 60(b)(5). '2 Ordinarily, the
denial of relief under Rule 60(b) is reviewed only for the abuse of
discretion, and here, as everyone agreed, the district court had
had no choice but to deny the motion because Aguilar was still
law. Justice Ginsburg warned that Rule 60(b) was not an
118 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
119 Id. at 2018-19.
'" Id. at 2019 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer [in part], JJ.,
dissenting).
121 Id. at 2021-22 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer [in part], JJ.,
dissenting).
"z Id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, Stevens, S.outer, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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alternative to a petition for rehearing and should not be "bent" to
this purpose.'
High drama here indeed. For those schooled in traditional
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, what had seemed like one of
the eternal verities was now breached: government-paid teachers
could conduct curricular education at church schools. The rule
prohibiting such direct aid had at least established a bright line in
a notoriously murky area of constitutional law.1 24
But five is not exactly an overwhelming majority. Which
leaves predictions about the future course of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence still very much a poker player's occupation.
BOERNE V. P.F. FLORES
If Agostini seemed like a seismic crack in the wall of church-
state separation, Boerne v. Flores12 was a reminder that the
Court is not always necessarily willing to accommodate asserted
religious needs. The background to Boerne is the Court's 1990
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,"26 which rejected a
Free Exercise Clause challenge to the State of Oregon's denial of
unemployment benefits to members of the Native American
Church who had been fired from their jobs because they joined in
their religion's sacramental use of peyote."z Smith held that
generally applicable laws (there, against drug use) that imposed a
burden on religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
government interest, and in the process substantially narrowed the
application of Free Exercise precedents that had required this
sort of showing by the state.'
2 Id.
124 Just two years earlier, the same five justices who decided Agostini had
breached another apparently unbreakable rule: that taxpayers' money could not
be directly given to support religious proselytizing. Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
12 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
126 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
127 Id. at 884.
12 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that denial of
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Congress responded to Smith in 1993 with RFRA," 9 which
reinstated the compelling state interest test. St. Peter Catholic
Church in the City of Boerne, Texas, brought suit under RFRA
challenging the city landmark commission's denial of a building
permit to enlarge the church. 130 The federal district court rejected
the claim, finding that with RFRA Congress exceeded its power
under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, 6-
3, agreed.
13 1
The Fourteenth Amendment, of course, provides that no state
shall deprive any person of the privileges and immunities of
citizenship, of due process, or of the equal protection of the
laws.132  Section 5 gives Congress "power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Amendment.
33
The Court had previously addressed the meaning of "enforce" in
the context of voting rights legislation, upholding Congress' §5
power to pass laws that went beyond what the Constitution
required, in order to remedy longstanding patterns of
discrimination that had deprived ethnic minorities of the
franchise. Thus, in Katzenbach v. Morgan134 and South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,135 the Court had upheld voting rights legislation
as "remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been
most flagrant." 11
No such remedial purpose, however, saved RFRA. There was
neither the kind of pervasive national record of discrimination
that justified Congress' exercise of its §5 powers in the voting
cases, nor, more importantly, the predominantly remedial
available to work on Saturday due to religious belief was a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause).
129 See supra note 8.
"3°Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
131 Id.
132 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
133 Id. at § 5.
134 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
135 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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purpose of the voting fights legislation.' Instead, RFRA
amounted to a congressional attempt to reinterpret the Free
Exercise Clause, a function that since Marbury v. Madison' has
been the prerogative of the judiciary. Moreover, according to
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority, RFRA's "[s]weeping
coverage insures its intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter." 1
39
Three justices dissented but interestingly, none took issue with
the §5 holding. Justices O'Connor and Breyer argued that Smith
was "gravely at odds with our earlier free exercise precedents"
and should be overruled.14° Only Justice Stevens, concurring,
thought it necessary to point out that RFRA raised not only §5 but
also Establishment Clause problems. 41 He explained that if the
historic landmark in Boerne had happened to be a museum owned
by a group of atheists rather than a church, they could not have
taken advantage of RFRA.'42 RFRA thus "provided the Church
with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can claim. This
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is
forbidden by the First Amendment." 
4 3
That only one of the nine justices saw fit even to mention this
apparently fundamental point is a good indication of the Court
majority's current disinterest in strict church-state separation.
Conclusion
What conclusions can be drawn from this tumultuous First
Amendment term? Despite the drama, the Court was generally
137 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169-71.
m 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).139 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
140 Id. at 2178 (O'Connor and Breyer, JI., dissenting). Justice Souter, in
essence, agreed, but thought that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed
because there had not been a full briefing on the propriety of overruling Smith.
Id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
411d. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
'
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deferential to government prerogatives; it struck down only one
law on First Amendment grounds, the plainly content-based and
draconian Communications Decency Act. Its understanding of
content discrimination in Turner, Schenck, and Glickman was
narrow. Similarly, the majority in Timmons, Turner, Boerne,
and Agostini took an unexpansive view of what constituted a
significant burden on First Amendment rights.
On the other hand, Reno indicates that the Court may be willing
to revisit some earlier assumptions about sexually explicit speech:
that it is necessarily harmful to minors, that it is generally of low
constitutional value, that it can be proscribed without
insurmountable vagueness problems. The justices may well be
anticipating the first online obscenity case to reach the Court-it
can't be far off. What will be considered "patently offensive"
according to the "contemporary community standards" of
cyberspace is anybody's guess.
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